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Abstract_______________________________________________________________ 
Based on an in-depth study of the northern Spanish economy in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, this paper argues that commercial expansion was a major source 
of the diverging performance of European regions. It develops an approach that 
integrates insights from more recent trade theory with those from new institutional 
economics. New trade theory informs the analysis of changes at a macro-level - defined 
as traded quantities, the structure of (inter-) regional integration and specialisation, and 
the larger institutional framework. New institutional economics are the basis for the 
interpretation of developments at a micro-level defined as the strategies of merchant 
organisations and individual firms within that larger framework. The paper shows how 
macro-level changes impacted upon - and interacted with - micro-level structures and 
processes of adaptation. The integration of quantitative and qualitative analysis 
demonstrates that the Commercial Revolution transformed the European economy more 
through structural change than through increased availability of goods. 
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2The century after 1550 was a watershed in the economic history of Western Europe. The most
powerful realm in economic as well as political terms, Spain, was suffering a turning point. In both
areas, the economic as well as the political her leverage in the European system began to decline. The
Netherlands and in particular England stood at the start of their ascendancy to the world's leading
maritime nations. This change was not simply a change in the absolute or relative fortune of these
countries (and even the question about 'absolute and relative' is a thorny issue). It shaped the economic
landscape of Western Europe, its economic agglomerations and trade flows for centuries. And with
Spain at the centre of a vast ultramarine empire and trading network at the start of our period and
England rising to a similar position by the mid-seventeenth century, these changes had global
consequences. Historians have looked to the colonial endeavours of European nations as at least one,
possibly decisive, explanatory path for relative economic performance in the centuries after 1492.
Underlying the vast ‘rise and decline of nations’ literature is a notion that colonial / commercial
expansion mattered.1 Unfortunately, it is less clear, why it was important, how big its influence was and
most interestingly, what the transmission mechanisms between external trade and European economies
were.
Furthermore, this period was not only one of changes in the economic leadership list of
European countries, but also one of increasing regional divergence in many of them. This is particularly
true for Spain, where recent research reveals the emerging distinctions between the economic
performances of its regions.2 This paper argues that the commercial expansion of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and the diverging performance of European regions are directly linked. New and
altered trade connections impacted on and interacted with the European economy through a process of
                                                
1 To give just a few examples of this ‘rise and fall’ historiography, Elliott, J.H., 'The decline of Spain', Past and
Present XX (1961), Elliott, J.H.,  'América y el problema de la decadencia espanola', Anuario de Estudios Americanos
28 (1971), pp. 1-23, García Sanz, A., 'Auge y decadencia en España en los siglos XVI y XVII: Economía y sociedad
en Castilla', Revista de Historia Económica ano III (1985) 1, pp. 11-27, Hamilton, E.J., 'The decline of Spain',
Economic History Review, 1st ser. VIII (1937/38), pp. 168-179, Israel, J.,  'Critique of Kamen's "The Decline of Spain,
A Historical Myth?" and Kamen's rejoinder', Past and Present 91 (1981), pp. 170-185, Stradling, R.A., Europe and
the Decline of Spain. A Study of the Spanish System, 1580-1720  (London, u.a., 1981), Andrews, K.R., Trade, Plunder
and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630  (Cambridge, 1984), Baechler,
J. and al., e., Europe and the Rise of Capitalism  (Oxford, 1988), North, D.C. and Thomas, R.P., The Rise of the
Western World: A New Economic History  (Cambridge, 1973), Parker, G., The Military Revolution: Military
Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800  (Cambridge, 1988), Tracy, J.D., ed.  The Rise of the Merchant
Empires. Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750 (Cambridge, 1990), Zanden, J.L.v., The Rise
and Decline of Holland's Economy. Merchant Capitalism and the Labour Market   (Manchester, 1994), Davis, R., The
Rise of the Atlantic Economies (London, 1973), Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic
Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000  (London, 1989), de Vries, J. and van der Woude, A., The First
Modern Economy. Success, failure, and perseverance of the Dutch economy, 1500-1815  (Cambridge, 1997).
2 See e.g. Ringrose, D.R., Madrid and the Spanish Economy, 1560-1850,  (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983) and more
recently the excellent study by García Espuche, A., Un siglo decisivo. Barcelona y Cataluña 1550-1640, Historia y
3structural change that can account for at least part of the regional divergence observed in the early
modern period. The paper distinguishes two important levels of the commercial sector that were
affected by the trade expansion. A macro-level describes the actual traded quantities, the structure of
(inter-) regional integration and specialisation and the larger institutional framework. A micro-level
defines the strategies of merchant organisations and individual firms within that larger framework. We
develop an approach that integrates the examination of the macro-level of trade based mainly on more
recent trade theory with that of a micro-level of trade that uses insights from new institutional
economics. Macro-level changes are shown to have impacted upon and interacted with micro-level
structures and processes of adaptation. It is shown that only through such an integrated analysis we can
begin to understand the linkages between the ´commercial revolution´ and the changes in the European
economy.
Having developed the theoretical framework in section I, the paper scrutinises in section II the
issues of the economic impact of commercial expansion on Europe's commerce on a regional level. It
provides a better understanding of how the integration of Spanish regions into the wider Atlantic
commercial world changed the trading patterns of these regions over the period of most intense commercial
expansion, i.e. between the mid-sixteenth and mi-seventeenth centuries. As a case study serves the northern
Spanish region comprising the Cantabrian coast and its hinterland, from the French border to the province
of Asturias towards the West and from the coastline to the Cantabrian Mountains.3 The discussion is split
into two sub-periods. During the first, 1550s-1620s the trade of the Cantabrian coast was closely integrated
into a Northern Castilian network. This, in turn, came to depend increasingly on the supply of fresh
liquidity from the Spanish colonies. In the second phase, 1620s-1650s, the Cantabrian networks changed
towards integration into a triangular trade with England and its North American dependencies. For each of
these periods the paper addresses in particular four questions. Firstly, how did the insertion into different
commercial networks affect the existing trade relations of Cantabria within the European sphere? Secondly,
how did changes in the trading patterns impact on the commercial agglomeration within the region and/or
on the interregional trading relations between Cantabria and the rest of the Iberian Peninsula? Thirdly,
which was the role played by the more important commercial institutions, in particular the merchant guilds
and corporations in this process? Finally, how did the merchants individually and as participants in the
larger international networks react to changes in their environment brought about by this Atlantic
expansion? Section three contains some concluding remarks.
                                                                                                                                                         
geografía. Ensayo, (Madrid, 1998).
3 The present day provinces of Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, Cantabria and Asturias are understood as one economic region.
While its political organisation was fragmented, its economy depended on a more or less uniform structure based on
fishing, shipbuilding, iron production and maritime trade combined with a relatively poor agricultural base.
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Surprisingly trade theory and the historiography of European expansion in the 16th and 17th
centuries have only rarely found common ground in their respective analysis. In fact, they have been
seen as largely contradicting each other. On the one hand, historians have rightly been suspicious about
an older generation of trade theory models that predicted that trade was always beneficial for every
region involved based on assumptions of perfect markets and information. The history of inequality
clearly contradicted this strong theoretical assumption. On the other hand, economic historians have
been struggling to explain the existence and persistence of commercial institutions that seemed to be
sub-optimal. Yet, this seeming contradiction between neo-classical trade theory and historical reality
can be easily resolved, if we distinguish analytically the various levels on which trade expansion
impacts on the commercial sector and distinguish more carefully the market structures on each level.
I.1 New trade theory and history: the macro-level
On the macro-level the questions dealt with are about the functioning of the commercial sector
within the wider economy and about the relative performance of state structures in providing a framework
conducive to economic development. It addresses the issues of if, how and why the quantities traded and
the directions of trade changed. And how did those changes affect a regional economy like the Cantabrian
one as regards the relative prosperity of groups and towns in the area itself? What was the impact on the
economic performance of the region on a larger comparative, interregional level?
The main problem in conceptualising the effects of the integration of one region into a more open
new trade is that a concept of pure comparative advantage, which predicts improvements for all
participants, seems to lack explanatory power. So while economists claimed that free trade is good for
everybody, history seemed to teach us otherwise. Yet, when considering present day debates on the
effects of an opening up of trade, it is conspicuous that all sorts of potentially negative results from the
point of view of one or more countries involved are taken for granted. We are used to assume that
differences in technology, wages (labour cost), endowments (factor costs), productivity, market size and
demand-supply conditions determine the outcome of increased openness. In short, the formerly all-
positive interpretation of increased openness and comparative advantage has been abandoned in favour
of a more complex analysis. Yet, what seems to be commonplace when dealing with today's trade, has
not been reflected in historical studies of the early colonial trades so far.4 What, then, are the insights
                                                
4 Prados de la Escosura, L., De imperio a nación. Crecimiento y atraso económico en España (1780-1930)   (Madrid,
1988) has discussed some the general issues mentioned here in the context of Spain’s economic performance in the
5that can be obtained from modern trade theory for the purpose of developing a framework to understand
the repercussions of American trade onto the European regions?
Firstly, and by no means trivial, trade is not a zero-sum-game. There are gains from increased
trade. Many scholars of pre-industrial history have tended to look at the period as one where someone's
gain is another one's loss. Although this notion is in most cases not explicit, it lies at the very heart of the
concept of 'rise and decline'. It has a tendency to ignore the difference between relative and absolute
growth. This in turn creates the picture of a largely static world. Looking at the evidence from the period
examples of overall growth in some sectors can be seen as assured even from our present day base of scant
knowledge. The very expansion into overseas territories and the resources bound in this trade are a vivid
indicator of that growth. The increase in all-European shipping capacities between 1550-1650 is another
one.5 This in turn seems to support those who argue that the newly opened America trades had lasting
consequences for the European economy in general and transformed the intra-European trading networks
in particular. If one accepts that there were potential gains from this trade and at the same time
acknowledges that these were not quite as straightforward as the simple concept of comparative advantage
would suggest, the question remains what these gains were in economic terms.
One very important distinction between two different types of gains from trade, which has been
discussed more clearly in recent research on international economics, can help to understand this seeming
contradiction.6 The first type is generally known as gains from exchange. The concept describes the
(positive) effects of an increased factor endowment and product availability as a consequence of the
opening up of new trades or the deepening of established ones. The discoveries and new trades of the 16th
and 17th centuries are obviously part of such a process and the consequences are well known. The
availability of new products, such as tropical foodstuffs or dyes, provided European consumers with a
completely new variety of goods. At the same time the increased production of others reduced prices in the
European market, as in the case of sugar. Most prominently, the expansion of economic markets increased
the availability of bullion in the European economy. This additional resource served not only to enrich
those involved in the industry, states and businesses alike, but also to supply the means of exchange for a
growing economy. Finally, the expansion of the market furnished the economy with a new source of
inexpensive (forced) labour, which played an important role in the rapid development of the mining and
plantation industries.
                                                                                                                                                         
19th century.
5 Hugill, P.J., World Trade since 1431. Geography, Technology, and Capitalism,  (Baltimore and London, 1993).
6 See Markusen, J.R., Melvin, J.R., Kaempfer, W.H. and Maskus, K.E., International Trade. Theory and Evidence
(New York et al., 1995), chapters 5.3 and 5.4.
6Gains from exchange have captured much of the discussion about the expansion of markets
beyond Europe most recently in the work of Williamson/O’Rourke and Stein/Stein.7 They also are the
centre of arguments about unequal exchange developed by historians and economists, most notably the
Wallersteinian model. Wallerstein argues that the way in which European countries extracted 'additional'
wealth from the non-European territories determined their own economic performance, while leaving the
newly discovered areas at the periphery. Many historians have used the additional resources from the
overseas world as an explanation for both, the experiences of England as well as Spain. For the former it is
argued that it benefited from the increased markets by developing her exports, especially in the cloth sector
or more precisely the 'new draperies'.8 The story for the latter runs differently. It is argued that Spain
concentrated excessively on pure resource extraction. This throttled economic activity in mainland Spain.
In addition, the home economy suffered from an inflation that was set off by the extraction economy.
Domestic production and commerce were severely hit and lost their international competitiveness.
Economic collapse followed suit. The main argument is one of an early case of 'Dutch disease'. The
concept of gains from exchange directs attention to the traded quantities or, from the point of view of
European producers and consumers, to the rise in factor endowments in the respective European
economies. However, when comparing this focus with the historical evidence two serious problems arise.
On the one hand, two opposing developments are explained by reference to the same process. It is
far from clear why England should have benefited so decisively from the new developments while Spain
was affected negatively. On the other hand, the quantities involved in the new intercontinental trade in
general were not very remarkable. One estimate  is that as late as 1780 the share of intercontinental trade in
Europe's GDP amounted to less than 2% of the total.9 The conclusion drawn from this is that changes
induced through the increased volume of the American trade must have been limited in scope. Hence it
would seem doubtful that this rather unspectacular trade can be held responsible for a major shift in the
                                                
7 O'Rourke, K.H. and Williamson, J.G., 'The Heckscher-Ohlin Model Between 1400-2000: When it Explained Factor
Price Convergence, When It Did Nort, and Why',  in  Conference commemorating the 100th Birthday of Bertil Ohlin,
(Stockholm, 1999) and Stein, S. J. and B. H. Stein, Silver, Trade, and War. Spain and America in the Making of Early
Modern Europe (Baltimore and London, 2000).
8 See Taylor, H.,  'Trade, Neutrality, and the 'English Road', 1630-1648', Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 25 (1972)
and Brenner, R.,  'The Social Basis of Economic Development', Journal of Economic History 32 (1972), for a critique
of the ‘export led growth’ interpretation.
9 O'Brien, P.K., 'European Industrialization. From the Voyages of Discovery to the Industrial Revolution', in The
European Discovery of the World, edited by Pohl, H. (1990), pp. 154-177, p.171. See also W. Brulez's studies on
Antwerp in the mid-16th century. With Antwerp on the height of its role as the entrepot for Europe asizeable share of
goods, which entered Europe from other continents, would go at some point through Antwerp. Yet, even for Antwerp
Brulez arrives at an estimate of a mere 14% for colonial products. This includes East and West Indies, but it also
includes those products from the East, which reached Europe via the traditional overland routes. Brulez, W., Der
Kolonialhandel und die Handelsblüte der Niederlande in der Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts, Kölner Vorträge zur Sozial-
und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Koeln, 1969).
7European trading networks, the changing fortunes of English and Spanish commerce or the economic
performance of particular European region such as Cantabria . From this point of view the repercussions of
American trade seem to have been overestimated and it is difficult to see a convincing link between the
structure of European commerce and the expansion of the overseas markets.
There are, however, also gains from specialisation as a result of the opening of new commercial
contacts. Specialisation is widely acknowledged to be a potent agent of economic growth in the pre-
industrial world. However, it has found little attention in the context of enhanced intercontinental trade. The
concept is a simple one. Every country or region, which participates in trade, will use its comparative
advantage in a fashion that allows efficiency gains without a change of the original factor endowment. It
can increase its output without a rise in input. Specialisation is the centre of this process and it enables the
trading partners to enjoy economies of scale and spill overs of knowledge and human capital. The position
of human capital as a non-depreciating factor in the process of accumulation, or to use a different word, in
growth has been strongly emphasised by the new growth theory.10 As a consequence not merely the traded
quantities matter, but also what could be labelled the qualitative factors.
The important difference that distinguishes gains from exchange from gains from specialisation, or
the more quantitative approach from the qualitative, is that the former is a static concept while the latter is
dynamic. In a dynamic world a completely new set of possible variables have to be included. The dynamic
welfare gains are based on several parallel effects of increased trade , which can cause important structural
changes.11 One effect is an increased competition, which arises once trade is opened. A more competitive
market helps to reduce monopolistic rents and usually forces those in this market to increase their quality.
In many cases, this results in pressure on individuals and groups to improve their organisational structures.
It will be argued that the Atlantic trade, into which Cantabria became integrated over this period, had
lasting influence on the organisational structure of the commercial sector in the region.
Another type of dynamic gains from specialisation are economies of scale, which were realised in
the process of market extension. External scale economies, the diffusion of knowledge and the emergence
of regional centres, which concentrated on a particular sector, are important factors in determining the
location of European centres of economic activity in general. Interregional specialisation was not confined
                                                
10 See the two most important articles Romer, P.M.,  'Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth', Journal of Political
Economy 94 (1986), pp. 1002-1037 and Romer, P.M., 'The Origins of Endogenous Growth', Journal of Economic
Perspectives 8 (1994), pp. 3-22.
11 For some discussions see Puga, D. and Venables, A.J., The spread of industry: spatial agglomeration in economic
performance, Centre for Economic Performance, Discussion Paper 279 (London, 1996), Nunnenkamp, P., Grundlach,
E. and Agarwal, J.P., Globalisation of Production and Markets (Kiel, 1994), Krugman, P., 'Increasing returns and
economic geography', Journal of Political Economy 99 (1990), pp. 483-499, Venables, A.J. and Krugman, P.,
Globalisation and the inequality of nations Centre for Economic Performance, Working Paper 1015 (1994).
8to the boundaries of Early Modern states; it was a process, which happened on a European scale and trade
flows and centres played an important role in this. The relevance of this factor for a market in which
information costs are as high as in sixteenth and seventeenth century can hardly be overestimated. The high
degree of specialisation of regions or single ports on only a few products confirms this. However, there
were not only external scale economies but also internal, i.e. economies which depended on the size of the
individual trading firm, the partnership or the company. The problem with markets in which internal scale
economies are present in the form of vertical integration is well known. They can enhance competition
because of increased efficiency which forces high cost firms to exit. However, given a certain structure of
the market they can also increase the possibility of one firm or organisation establishing itself as a
monopolist in the market. Hence, internal economies of scale might work to the benefit of a trading sector
as a whole or just that of a single company or organisation; the precise outcome therefore is far from clear.
Generally, the main problem with these dynamic forces is that they may or may not work in the same
direction. The increase in competitive pressure and the resulting decrease in monopolistic position might
well be offset or even overcompensated by the fact that one firm or organisation profits hugely from
internal economies of scale. Equally, if the pattern of specialisation is determined by scale economies rather
than by comparative advantage it is arbitrary which region's respective sector establishes itself as a prime-
mover in the market and reaps initial benefits which make it impossible for another regions economy to
move into the same market.
The problem that we have to research therefore is not only whether there were gains from trade
(there were) but how they were distributed. Given the potentially contradictory forces unleashed by an
opening up of new trade, what kind of distribution of the gains from trade can be expected? Because
markets were imperfect, the gains from trade would not have been shared equally between regions,
between sectors within regions or, for that matter, groups within society. Instead the outcome depends on a
variety of factors, among others the initial factor endowment of those participating in the trade, the
organisational structure of the trade and all sorts of market imperfections. In this light the entirely distinct
experience of Spain and England following the opening up of the America commerce does not look as
puzzling, as it did when starting the analysis from the point of view of pure comparative advantage. The
relation between commercial expansion and European regional economies is not a simple matter of
quantities and resource extraction. In order to assess the repercussions of the American commerce on the
commercial sector of Spanish regions the qualitative factors, i.e. changes in the structure of trade, are at
least as important, and probably more important, than the quantitative expansion of the market. In order to
study their lasting impact it is of crucial importance to research the European trade in depth and detail.
9I.2 Institutional change and organisational adaptation: the micro-level
While trade theory can help to understand the distributive impact of trade on the macro-level, it is
ill equipped to explain issues of institutional change and organisational adaptation on the micro-level.
Trade theory supposes exchange to be frictionless and costless, but costs arising in a world of imperfect
markets and imperfect information are precisely what requires institutional organisation. Incorporating
these institutions and organisations is not to replace the neo-classical theoretical framework, but to make it
more 'real' by introducing a discussion of the relationship between social institutions and economic
performance. The institutional and organisational set-up determines how secure property rights are and how
important transaction costs are.12 These issues are addressed by focusing on two main themes. Firstly, how
did the most important merchant institutions, the guilds, react to the changes in the structure of Cantabria's
trade? Secondly, how did the merchants involved adapt their trading networks and practise?
Theoretically, the question here is how individual merchant houses or organisations and companies
adapted to changes of the institutional structure on the one hand and market incentives on the other. The
most important form of adaptation lies in how an organisation designs its contracts. Contracts represent the
internal control, which can be exerted by the organisation while it usually will not be able to influence the
sphere of external control, which is represented by the state.13 (Although the latter might be changed
through collective action this will not be a viable choice in most decision processes.) Generally, in studies
of structure and change of institutions on the micro-level it is assumed, that the contract structure reflects
the most efficient way to organise business under the given conditions, i.e. it reflects economic rationality
or at least bounded rationality.14
This is especially important when dealing with organisations which from the point of view of a
neo-classical model without transaction costs would be judged to be economically inefficient. This is the
case of most Early Modern trading companies and merchant guilds because their raison d'etre was usually
to exclude non-members from certain trades and to build up monopoly power. The problem at the centre of
a debate about the efficiency of those trading companies is the relationship between principal and agent.
Given the inefficiencies of transport and information merchants had to rely on the accuracy of information
provided by their factors, agents or trading partners in a foreign region. An effective surveillance of their
                                                
12 See, e.g.Eggertsson, T., 'A note on the economics of institutions', in Empirical Studies in Institutional Change,
edited by Alston, L.J., Eggertsson, T. and North, D.C. (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 6-24, North, D.C., Institutions,
Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990), Williamson, O., The Economic Institutions of
Capitalism  (New York, 1985)
13 See Alston, Lee J., Thrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, ed. Empirical Studies in Institutional Change.
(Cambridge 1996).
14 See Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism.
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services was hardly possible or simply prohibitively expensive. In such a situation cheating on the principal
promised high gains to the agent. From this point of view opportunistic behaviour was much more likely
than an earnest relationship.
There were two ways of dealing with this problem. The first one is through formal institutions
designed to reduce the risk, for example through contractual agreements with the traders, vertical or
horizontal integration of businesses and investment into common enforcement by means of companies,
merchant guilds etc. A second form of dealing with the threat of opportunistic behaviour are informal
institutions, trust built on the membership of certain regional, religious, commercial groups, family or
citizenship. The common problem in both cases was obviously the enforcement. It was one of the main
purposes of the early modern mercantile bodies like the Consulados (Spanish merchant guilds) to limit
opportunistic behaviour through formal institutions. However, these bodies could follow either one of two
strategies. They could act as a “contractually efficient form for extracting monopoly rents” or as
“transactionally efficient form for conducting long-distance trade“15
A rent-seeking strategy meant that the optimisation target was not efficiency but market power in
order to achieve the highest possible gains for those involved in the company. However, it could also be
argued that the Consulados built up a vertically integrated structure as a means to internalise information
costs. The integrated structure allowed mercantile associations to reduce the cost of recurrent transactions,
which were subject to all sorts of problems of asymmetric information. The companies might have
developed this vertically integrated structure "not because a private market did not exist, but because
operating by managerial fiat inside the hierarchical firm was less costly than using the market."16
The discussion illustrates the problems encountered when looking at the question of institutional
adaptation on the micro-level. If an organisation can be considered efficient or not is not merely a
consideration of its 'balance sheet', but about what it tried to maximise as a result of its internal
organisational structure, the incentives provided by the wider institutional framework and the market
structure. In the following, we will first look at the macro-level and then try to assess the way in which the
insertion of the Cantabrian region into the Atlantic commerce impacted on the micro-level by looking at the
main players involved, i.e. the merchants and their corporations.
                                                
15 Jones, S.R.H. and Ville, S.P., 'Efficient Transactors or Rent-Seeking Monopolist? The Rationale for Early Chartered
Trading Companies', Journal of Economic History  56 (1996) 4, pp. 898-916, p.899.
16 Carlos, A/Nicholas, Stephen. ‘Giants of an Earlier Capitalism: The Early Chartered Companies as an Analogue of
the Modern Multinational.’ Business History Review, 26 (3 1988), p.400.
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II
II.1 Some Results: the macro level
1550s-1620s:
The structure of the Northern Spanish commercial sector in the second half of the 16th century
is relatively well known and it is possible to summarise its main characteristics.17 Foreign trade was
based largely on the exchange of a few staple goods. Northern Spain exported wool and iron via the
Cantabrian ports in exchange for Northern European cloths and, to a lesser degree, foodstuffs (mainly
grain). The business cycle of the valuable ‘wool for cloth exchange’ largely determined the fortunes of
the trade as a whole.
The returns from a new wool tax introduced in the 1560s give an idea of the volume and
distribution of this trade. Table 1 contains the returns paid in the more important ports of Santander,
Bilbao, Deva, Laredo and San Sebastián.18 The overwhelming part of this wool was shipped to Flanders
and only in the 1570s did French ports become the destination of a larger percentage of total wool
exports. Albeit, by this time the total exports were falling rapidly. 19
                                                
17 A few particularly important works can be mentioned here: Abed al-Hussein, F.H., 'Trade and business community
in Old Castile. Medina del Campo, 1500-1575', unpubl. PhD (1982), Priotti, J.-P., 'Bilbao et le commerce europeen au
XVIe siecle', unpubl. PhD (Toulouse 1997), Fernández de Pinedo, E., Crecimiento económico y transformaciones
sociales en el País Vasco (1100-1850)   (Madrid, 1974), Bilbao Bilbao, L.M.,  'Crisis y recontrucción de la economia
vascongada en el siglo XVII', Saioak  1 (1977), pp. 157-180, Lapeyre, H., El comercio exterior de Castilla a través de
las aduanas de Felipe II  (Valladolid, 1981), Ulloa, M., La Hacienda Real de Castilla en el reinado de Felipe II
(Rome, 1963), Casado Alonso, H., 'El comercio internacional burgales en el siglo XVI', in Historia de Burgos.
(Burgos, 1992), pp. , Casado Soto, J.L., Cantabria en los siglos XVI y XVII  (Santander, 1986), Azpiazu Elorza, J.A.,
Sociedad y vida social vasca en el siglo XVI. Mercaderes guipuzcoanos  (Oiartzun, 1990), García Sanz, A., Desarrollo
y crisis del Antigua Regimen en Castilla la Vieja. Economia y sociedad en tierras de Segovia de 1500-1814   (Madrid,
1986), Fernández Albadalejo, P., La crisis del Antiguo Régimen en Guipúzcoa 1766-1833. Cambio económico e
historia  (Madrid, 1975), Yun Casalilla, B., Sobre la transición la capitalismo en Castilla. Economía y sociedad en
Tierra de Campos (1500-1830)  (Valladolid, 1987), Basas Fernández, M., El consulado de Burgos en el siglo XVI
(Burgos, facsimil 1994 ed. 1963).
18 It should be noted that the data for San Sebastián is not strictly comparable since wool from Navarra (which usually
left the peninsula through San Sebastián) for some time enjoyed preferential rates and the tax rates also varied by
destination of the cargo. Lapeyre, H.,  'Algunos datos sobre el movimiento del puerto de San Sebastián en tiempos de
Felipe II', Boletin de Estudios Históricos sobre San Sebastián  5 (1971), pp. 181-191, p.186.
19 Casado Alonso, H., 'El comercio internacional burgales en los siglos XV y XVI',  in  V Centenario del Consulado de
Burgos, (Burgos, 1995), p.194-195.
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Table 1
Tax returns from wool exports through several northern ports 1560-1626 (maravedís)
year Santander Bilbao Laredo Deva San Sebastián
1560
1561 3,439,155 1,827,437 1,200,000
1562 6,467,889 2,001,874 897,375
1563 4,722,186 1,435,312 723,927 1,203,107
1564 5,026,688 2,306,811 940,389
1565 7,281,841 2,138,964 1,338,750 1,069,999
1566 6,618,863 2,258,047 163,125 613,683
1567 12,302,561 2,410,665 1,778,613 1,165,865
1568 9,887,825 2,319,255 2,231,187
1569 1,278,934 881,999 493,856
1570 17,790,490 5,084,857 3,208,312 1,101,183
1571 4,229,351 4,091,352 1,694,341 2,749,266 45,857
1572 2,621,025 4,160,009 608,786 1,238,387 161,987
1573 2,170,598 4,863,711 375,206 2,848,008 612,049
1574 1,220,783 984,371 804,894 1,362,018 318,509
1575 748,654 4,381,298 465,034 2,795,176 345,966
1576 4,398,689 3,157,686 105,805 3,503,793 1,072,073
1577 4,666,735 2,752,994 56,839 2,495,803 1,270,494
1578 5,451,830 2,384,388 0 4,789,527 1,554,733
1579 6,283,661 1,227,594 5,393 8,295,401 1,565,390
1580 7,024,608 1,373,241 12,678 4,649,174 1,853,838
1581 6,229,764 2,301,234 484,017 4,912,491 2,113,133
1582 4,774,764 1,960,673 3,870,094 757,210
1586  2,416,004
1587
1588  566,770
1589
1590 101,612 99,217 835,840 515,135
1591 -  502,597 123,114 295,190 696,562
1592 - 821,842 326,451 180,030 494,925
1593 41,221 2,380,740 475,575 478,111 1,192,608
1594 44,900 3,377,932 465,039 910,093 1,513,694
1595
1611  406,830
1612
1613
1614 - 2,446,034 937,242 409,566 4,317,582
1615 - 1,871,088 1,265,802 2,292,810 3,940,024
1616 - 2,069,055 1,373,218 1,655,478 6,050,176
1617 1,918,000 1,318,000 0 433,860 5,822,358
1618 1,503,000 1,559,000 693,000 7,155,000
1619 - 916,344 0 1,594,848 8,679,932
1620 1,319,191 1,005,220 550,083 1,364,218 8,417,234
1621 1,362,600 1,681,052 695,592 1,179,210 7,147,276
1622 1,128,689 1,692,283 1,356 658,518 7,939,615
1623 2,658,301 1,937,569 4,032 1,100,160 5,636,564
1624 2,068,746 2,213,837 8,216 1,974,046 6,824,322
1625 - 2,166,404 420 1,273,153 2,809,303
1626 2,312,266 1,471,659 3,480 1,503,490 5,153,402
Source: Ulloa (1963); Fernández Albadalejo (1975); Priotti (1997); Israel (1980). There are some differences
between the data by Fernández Albadalejo and Israel for 1614-26. The former have been used and completed with
the latter.
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The data shown in Table 1 allow some very general conclusions. Firstly, the trade was subject
to strong volatility. Secondly, fluctuations of exports for each port were even wider than those of the
export totals. No port managed to acquire a position of dominance for this main staple export in the 16th
century. Santander had generally the largest share but, at least in some years, Bilbao and the small port
of Deva challenged its position. The relative importance of Cantabrian ports in the wool trade
contrasted strongly with the rest of commercial activity, in which Bilbao clearly had a leading role by
the mid-16th century.20 The surprising lack of economic concentration in the wool / cloth shipping
business was largely a consequence of the governing structures of this trade. The state protected
framework favoured a legal and institutional set-up that supported certain group interests. It also
brought about a very unusual pattern of specialisation between trading places rather than between
merchants.
The heart of the northern Spanish system were the Castilian fairs at Villalón, Medina de
Rioseco and, most famously, Medina del Campo, which acquired a position of predominance within the
Spanish economy when the Crown began to use them as points of entry for the receipts of bullion from
its Latin American possessions.21 They functioned as both trade and payment fairs, and it was here that
the monetary economy met the real economy. The enormous amounts of liquidity entering the Castilian
economy at the fairs facilitated credit/banking enterprises and goods exchange.22 The fairs served as the
point of contact and trading for the merchants, for most goods were not physically moved to the fair
towns. By the 1550s, the fairs reached their apogee. The northern export and import trades were
dominated by the powerful merchant guild of Burgos, the Consulado de Burgos. In Medina del Campo
two out of three buyers of wool were from Burgos and they moved raw material directly from
producing areas to Burgos.23  From here, the Consulado merchants sent wool onwards to the Cantabrian
ports, mostly Santander, Bilbao and Deva.
As a whole the Northern Castilian economy was a highly ‘closed’ system, i.e. one in which
monopolies and privileges created high barriers to entry for any newcomer. Charters and royal grants
protected the role of each town's merchant community and precluded easy access for non-members or
non-citizens. Because of its role in crown payments, Medina enjoyed the privilege of being the main
clearance centre for all commercial bills. This applied to both Castilian merchants and foreigners
                                                
20 This is apparent if the tax returns for the general duty on all goods, the diezmos, are compared for the respective
ports. The returns have been published by Ulloa, La Hacienda Real and Lapeyre, El comercio exterior. See also
[Grafe, 1998 #526], chapter 3.
21 For a detailed discussion of the strong influence of crown payments paid out of Latin American silver shipments see
in particular the very study for Medina del Campo by Abed al-Hussein, 'Trade and business community', part 3.
22 Yun Casalilla, B., Sobre la transición .
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operating on the northern coast.24 Equally, the export trade in wool was a monopoly of the merchants of
the Consulado de Burgos. The guild also controlled the important import trade of cloth from Northern
Europe, which constituted the return cargo for most merino shipments. Wool was shipped in convoys to
the main markets in Bruges, Antwerp or Nantes where representatives of the Burgos merchant guild
organised the unloading and factors, agents and correspondents of guild merchants sold wool and
bought cloth and other goods.25 The decision to favour one port or another belonged to the Consulado
de Burgos, which was keen to foster competition between Cantabrian ports and its power allowed the
merchant guild to play the merchants and shipping interests in the Cantabrian ports against each other.
In the 1570s this Castilian commercial ‘system’ started to decline. Both, the peculiar pattern of
specialisation and the way in which Northern Spain had become dependent on to a constant supply of
liquidity out of Spanish American bullion made it ill-equipped to weather internal or external shocks.
The need for liquidity proved to be a recipe for disaster when bullion inflows became infrequent in the
1570s and the crown deferred the fairs or even cancelled them. The strong interdependence between
fairs, on the one hand, and the fair system and the Burgos merchants on the other caused a domino
effect of bankruptcies.26
Additional external shocks such as the loss of the Dutch, Flemish and Brabant markets because
of the 80 years war of Dutch independence hit the Burgos guild merchants directly and exposed the
dangers of the prevailing interdependence between the towns. It also laid open the disadvantages arising
from the large number of commercial functions - such as import-export trade, money lending and
insurance - concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and compañias.27 The intricate relationships
                                                                                                                                                         
23 Abed al-Hussein, 'Trade and business community', p.28.
24 The classical study for Castile is probably still the introductory chapter of Ruiz Martín, F., Lettres marchandes
échangées entre Florence et Medina del Campo  (Paris, 1965), more recently republished as Ruiz Martín, F., Pequeño
capitalismo, gran capitalismo. Simon Ruiz y sus negocios en Florencia. (Barcelona, 1990). See also Basas Fernández,
El consulado de Burgos, chapter VII for Burgos, or more recently Priotti, J.-P.,  'Bilbao' for the Flemish and French
merchants resident in Bilbao. The same was true for English cloth merchants operating in Cantabria. See e.g. Archivo
Foral de Bizkaia (hereafter AFB), Corr., Leg. 1040/050; Leg.1040/063; Leg.2232/043; Leg.2653/084; Leg.2653/121.
25 Marechal, J., 'La colonie espagnole de Bruges du XIVe au XVIe siecle', Revue du Nord  XXXV (1953), pp. 5-40,
Phillips, C.R., 'Spanish Merchants and the Wool Trade in the Sixteenth Century', Sixteenth Century Journal 3 (1983),
pp. 259-282, Phillips, W.D., 'Spain's Northern Shipping Industry in the Sixteenth Century', Journal of European
Economic History 17 (1988) 2, pp. 267-301, Casado Alonso, H., 'La nation et le quartier des Castillans de Bruges
(XVe et XVIe siecles)', Genootschap voor geschiedenies handelingen 133 (1996) 1-3, pp. 61-77, Casado Alonso, H.,
'El comercio internacional burgales'.
26 Ruiz Martín, F., 'El Consulado de Burgos y las ferias de pagos de Castilla', in Actas del V Centenario del Consulado
de Burgos (1494-1994) , (Burgos, 1994) on the interdependence of both, Basas Fernández, M., El consulado de
Burgos, p.218ff and Abed al-Hussein, 'Trade and business community', p.255ff. for the series of bankruptcies hitting
the Medina del Campo market in the 1570s. However, it must be noted that the fairs' function as credit and banking
centres was particularly hit. The survival and adaptation of the goods fairs showed that their raison d'etre had not
ceased. This argument has been made in particular by Yun Casalilla, B., Sobre la transición .
27 Phillips, W.D. and Phillips, C.R., 'Spanish Wool and the Dutch Rebels: The Middelburg Incident of 1574', American
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between trading places and their institutions started to disappear until the famous Medina del Campo
fairs ceased to exist in the early 17th century. The interdependence had exacerbated the crisis rather than
protecting merchants and institutions.
The initial effects of these disruptions for Cantabria were severe. Trade in goods fell to
unprecedented lows. The Consulado de Burgos had exported around 25,000 sacks of Castilian wool
yearly through Cantabrian ports between 1530-60. In the 1560s the average fell to about 14,000, and to
less than 5,000 in 1580-85. 28 As a consequence, import trade declined sharply as well. This situation
continued into the first decades of the 17th century.29
1620s-1650s
At some point in the 1620s the situation changed profoundly. Although the deep recession in
the northern Castilian towns continued, commercial activity in the Cantabrian region began to pick up.
A clear indicator for this are the averías levied by the Consulado of Bilbao, an ad valorem duty that
illustrates the commercial upswing in this most important port on the coast.30
                                                                                                                                                         
Historical Review 82 (1988), pp. 312-330
28 Averages derived from Casado Alonso, H., 'El comercio internacional burgales , cuadro II, p.194/195.
29 García Sanz, A., 'Castile 1580-1650: economic crisis and the policy of "reform"', in The Castilian crisis of the
seventeenth century. New perspectives  on the economic and social history of seventeenth century Spain , edited by
Thompson, I.A.A. and Yun Casalilla, B. (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 13-31.
30 The averia was not entirely uniform in its structure but the effective rate of taxation was very similar over all goods,
for more detail see Grafe, R., American Trade and the Cantabrian Economy, 1550-1650 Harvard University,
International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, 1500-1800, Working Paper 99-22 (Cambridge/MA, 1999).
It should be noted that the duty was increased in 1648/49, so that the increase after that year is overstated. However,
the trend clearly did not change.
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Source: AFB/CB, Libro 208, Nr. 1-11, Libro 210, Nr.13-21, Libro 211, Nr.22-33, Libro 212, Nr.34-36 and P.
Ezkiaga, Bilboko.
An analysis of the commodities traded shows the nature of this revival of trade. The Bilbao
libros de averías do not provide information on the quantities exported or imported but a plain
frequency measure can be used as a proxy: the percentage of larger ships (navíos) entering or leaving
the port with a certain good aboard.31 Table 2 and 3 show the change in the composition of trade from
the early 1620s, still in the depression, towards the mid 1640s, well into the general recovery.
                                                
31 The absolute numbers of loads are: exports: 1620/21 (158); 1621/22 (142); 1622/23 (189); 1632/33 (97); 1633/34
(76); 1635/36 (116); 1636/37 (141); 1637/38 (145), 1638/39 (193); 1640/41 (172); 1641/42 (160); 1642/43 (165);
1643/44 (152). Imports: 1620/21 (342); 1621/22 (218); 1622/23 (274); 1632/33 (137); 1633/34 (103); 1635/36 (152);
1636/37 (156); 1637/38 (167); 1638/39 (180); 1640/41 (167); 1641/42 (202); 1642/43 (164); 1643/44 (127). For a
more detailed analysis and data on a longer period see Grafe, R., ‘Northern Spain Between the Iberian and Atlantic
Worlds: Trade and Regional Specialisation, 1550-1650’, unpubl. PhD, London 2001, chapters 4 and 5.
Graph 1: Bilbao's trade 1603-1658: returns of the Averia  (nominal)
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Table 2
Bilbao exports 1620-1644: cargoes and goods registered in the libros de averías (%)
1620/
21
1621/
22
1622/2
3
1632/
33
1633/3
4
1635/3
6
1636/3
7
1637/3
8
1638/3
9
1640/4
1
1641/4
2
1642/4
3
1643/4
4
iron and steel 43.8 60.5 57.3 1.5 11.5 8.4 59.1 44.9 58 63.6 63.2 67.6 73
wool / lambswool 1.9 4.5 4.2 23.1 26 21.4 47 44.9 48.9 39.5 28.1 37.8 42.6
tar and pitch 0.6 3.5 0.4 - - - - - - - - - -
manufactures 0.3 0.5 0.4 - - - - - 1.7 3.7 2.3 4.7 8.2
unspecified 0.6 2 10.4 50 41.7 58.8 16.5 8.8 - - - - -
misc. exp 0.3 - - - - - - - 1.1 - - 1.4 0.8
empty 46.9 28 28.1 - 7.3 8.4 5.2 12.2 16.5 18.5 21.6 14.5 6.6
n.a. 4.5 3.0 7.6 4.3 7.5 0.6
multiple 1.2 5 4.2 0.8 1 4.6 33 17 28.4 24.7 17.5 29.1 28.7
Source: AFB/CB, Libro 211, No.24, No.38, No.39, No.40, No.41 and AHPV, Leg.3117s.f., Leg.3119s.f.,
Leg.3120s.f., Leg.3121s.f., Leg.4726s.f., Leg.4727s.f., Leg.4728s.f., Leg.4729s.f., Leg.4730s.f., Leg.4731s.f.,
Leg.5017s.f., Leg.5018s.f., Leg.5019s.f., and AFB, Corr., Leg.1119, f.1-122.
Table 3
Bilbao imports 1620-1644: cargoes and goods registered in the libros de averías (%)
1620/2
1
1621/2
2
1622/2
3
1632/3
3
1633/3
4
1635/3
6
1636/3
7
1637/3
8
1638/3
9
1640/4
1
1641/4
2
1642/
43
1643/4
4
fish total 25.9 46 38.1 48.5 21.9 70.2 58.5 61.9 69.9 60.5 67.8 57.4 59
fat 5.2 10.5 6.5 3.1 5.2 6.9 16.1 15.6 6.8 9.9 11.1 13.5 7.4
grain / beans 38.9 16 15.8 18.5 31.3 13.7 8.5 6.8 4 2.5 7.6 4.1 1.6
raw materials 9.6 15 8.8 7.7 6.3 8.4 19.5 10.2 8 7.4 8.2 5.4 8.2
manufactures 12.7 9.5 20.4 20 28.1 11.5 16.9 12.9 9.7 13.6 21.1 16.2 23
wine 4 5.5 3.8 0.8 - 3.8 6.8 4.1 3.4 6.8 1.8 3.4 1.6
colonial 1.2 2 1.9 0.8 - - - 0.7 - 0.6 - 5.4 2.5
‘balotes’ 3.4 3 1.9 - - - - - - - - - -
unspecified - - - 3.8 10.4 - - - - - - - -
misc. 4 1.5 7.7 2.3 2.1 1.5 5.9 1.4 0.6 1.9 0.6 5.4 0.8
n.a. 2.2 3 3.8 1.5 1 - - - - - - - -
empty 0.6 2 2.3 0.8 1 3.1 - 2 5.7 13 5.8 9.5 8.2
multiple 16.4 21 20 11.5 13.5 19.8 33.9 27.2 14.8 17.3 23.4 28.4 12.3
Source: see Table 4.2
The trade revival was driven on the one hand by an upturn in wool exports. On the other hand a
large increase in fish imports accounted for the surprising improvements in imports. Both products were
not new in Northern Spanish trade. But a closer examination shows that the structure of this trade had
changed substantially. Wool demand now came not from the Netherlands or France, but for the first
18
time from England. Data derived from around 1,200 individual wool tax bills, payable six months after
the shipment, illustrate this point.32
Table 4
Bilbao wool exports 1632-1644:
Annual tax returns (maravedís), total exports (kg) and destinations (in%)
Year wool tax wool exports To France % To England % Other %
1632 *(3,300,000) *(268,400) 38.9 60.3 0.8
1633 *(4,500,000) *(366,000) 69.9 30.1 0
1634 6,069,028 493,614 51.2 48.1 0.7
1635 3,753,030 305,246 36.6 63.4 0
1636 ***6,902,182 561,377 0 100 0
1637 9,831,601 799,636 0 99 1
1638 12,386,307 1,007,420 0 100 0
1639 13,402,956 1,090,107
1640 10,448,618 849,821
1641 10,101,916 821,623
1642 7,338,894 596,897 2.2 93.4 4.4
1643 11,696,626 951,326
1644 **(12,000,000) **(976,000)
* Rounded lower bound estimate on the basis of data for individual tax bills for the year.
** Rounded lower bound estimate on the basis of data for individual tax bills for four months.
*** Taxes paid in the dry port of Valmaseda in this year were 64,430 maravedís vellon = ca. 48,320 maravedís
silver, AHPV, Leg.3121, s.f.
Source: AHPV, Leg.3117s.f., Leg.3119s.f., Leg.3120s.f., Leg.3121s.f., Leg.4726s.f., Leg.4727s.f., Leg.4728s.f.,
Leg.4729s.f., Leg.4730s.f., Leg.4731s.f., Leg.5017s.f., Leg.5018s.f., Leg.5019s.f., and AFB, Corr., Leg.1119, f.1-122.
The strong demand for high quality Spanish wool in England, amounting to between 8-10 % of
the English domestic wool production33, changed the pattern of trade in the traditional Cantabrian –
Northern European trades. However, more importantly English merchants paid for their purchases not
in cloths, demand for which had fallen dramatically in the Castilian hinterland. Instead they imported
vast quantities of the single important ‘colonial’ good from English America: dried and salted cod.
Pescado de la Birginia became around the later 1630s the most sought after import good on the
Cantabrian Coast. Most of it came from New England and the term ‘Birginia’ was simply a generic
description for the English settlements in the New World. 34 Cantabrian and French Basque fishermen
had since the mid-sixteenth century delivered Newfoundland-cod to the northern ports. Yet, this fishing
sector declined as it was replaced and considerably expanded by imports from the merchant-organised
trade in dried cod from the new Anglo-American mainland colonies. This structural change in the
                                                
32 See Grafe, American Trade for a detailed description of this source.
33 Based on production estimates in Bowden, P.J., The Wool Trade in Tudor and Stuart England   (New York  /
London, 1962), p.37ff.
34 In the accounts between the English merchant resident at Bilbao Anthony Watts and the Bilbao merchant Domingo
de Semper ‘bacalao de la Birginia’ is the main item trade in the later 1640s. AFB, Corr., Leg. 0165/016. The term also
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supply of the single most important imported foodstuff becomes apparent when looking at the
seasonality of cod deliveries.
Graph 2
Seasonality of Bilbao cod imports, 1635/36 (number of ships)
Source: AFB/CB, Libro 212, No.36.
Up to the 1620s local fishermen entered the northern ports with Newfoundland cod between
September and early December at the end of a hectic and short summer fishing season. However, by the
mid-1630s most of the increasing amounts of fish entered the Bilbao port between February and April,
when demand was particularly high because of Lenten fasting (Graph2). Only the fisheries off the
North American mainland could supply fish around the year and in particular has an important fishing
season in spring. Thus the seasonality shows clearly that the local fishing sector had all but disappeared
in comparison to a new triangular trade set up by English merchants who shipped English products to
the new colonies, fish to northern Spain and wool back to England.
                                                                                                                                                         
appears recurrently in the libros de averías.
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Within the Cantabrian region the revival of some of the core trades had a distinctly positive
impact on the iron-producing sector.35 Iron was in high demand in England and the increased shipping
activity and the presence of a large English merchant community presumably eased access to foreign
markets for iron, which had been almost lost during the worst moments of crisis. In fact, demand was so
high that English exporters at times fought over shipping space and the price of iron compared
favourably (for the producer!) with late 16th century prices.36 Thus, the shift in commercial integration
was accompanied by a marked shift in the performance of different sectors on the Cantabrian coast. It
favoured local merchants strongly, who established strong contacts with the new foreign community,
and it strengthened the proto-industrial iron sector. At the same time, the region’s shipping and
shipbuilding sector did not profit at all from the upturn in trade, since shipping was entirely foreign. It
certainly helped consumers with a cheap and abundant supply of one of the important staple foods,
bacalao.
Following the breakdown of the late 16th century northern Spanish commercial ‘system’ centred
around Burgos and Medina, the Cantabrian Coastal region also experienced finally the process of
commercial agglomeration that had been absent in the later 16th century. Bilbao emerged as the by far
most important trading centre supplying the commercial services that a growing foreign merchant
community needed. The wool trade had been freed largely of the earlier monopoly structure and the fish
import trade grew not at least because no regulation was in place to restrict foreigners access. The town
became the distribution centre for cod imports not only for the northern coast but also for the Castilian
hinterland, particularly Madrid. 37 In the 1640s an English observer stated that
“Bilbao is a Town that send more English Manufacture and fish, then any one Port in
Christondome for tis the Inlet to all Casteele, and serves all the Coast along the Westward,
as far as the Borders of Portugall […] “.38
At the same time all other ports on the northern coast lost international trade in favour of Bilbao,
whereby the smaller ports stopped competing for foreign trade altogether.39
The integration into the English colonial networks also changed the patterns of integration
between the Cantabrian region and Castile. The cutting out of Castilian traders from the profitable wool
                                                
35 It became general practise that English merchants advanced the capital needed for the production of high quality bar
iron, see e.g. Archivo Histórico Provincial de Vizcaya (hereafter AHPV), Leg.3121/Enc5/s.f. 19.10.1637.
36 AFB, Corr., Leg. 1121/101, prices compared with Barkham, M.M.,  'Shipowning, shipbuilding and trans Atlantic
fishing in Spanish Basque ports 1560-1630: Motrico and Zumaya',  unpubl. PhD (Oxford 1991).
37 This becomes apparent from the contracts between English merchants and arrieros, muleteer traders, see e.g.
AHPV, Leg. 2556/s.f. varios and Grafe, ‘Northern Spain’, chapter 6.
38 British Museum (hereafter BM), Manuscripts 712.g.15/9
39 See Echevarría Alonso, M.J., La actividad comercial del puerto de Santander en el siglo XVII (Santander, 1995),
see also the report of the Veedor de contrabando 1629 in AFB, Corr., Leg.1296/022.
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and fish trades reduced transaction costs in these sectors. Merchants from the Cantabrian coast and
mainly from Bilbao ventured directly into the hinterland to establish contact with suppliers of wool and
consumers of fish. The previously highly institutionalised commercial contacts gave way to a trade with
lower barriers to entry, where newcomers did not have to comply with the rules of the game established
by the monopoly organisations, such as the Consulado de Burgos. However, the collapse of this
‘closed’ trading networks and the decline of towns such as Burgos and Medina del Campo was not a
sign of disintegration of a national market. Instead integration took now place in a much less formalised
way, without the protection of the state sponsored merchant organisations, but also without their
restrictions of access. Direct trade between the main commercial centre of the coast, Bilbao, and Castile
increased rather than decreased.
II.2 Some Results: the micro level
1550s-1620s
Within this institutional setting of monopoly-company trade merchants attempted to internalise
problems arising from principal - agent relations and other sources of risk through networks of kinship
and reputation both within their group and in the ports of destination. The most important European
port in the mid-16th century was Antwerp, and the Spanish community was the single largest group of
foreigners in the city. Spanish guild merchants were closely integrated into the native society, acquiring
property, forging family links through marriage and ‘exchanging apprentices’ with other Spanish and
local merchant houses.
The role of Cantabrians in this trading network was largely confined to transport, although
some moved from being mere factors and correspondents of bigger Castilian merchants to being
important traders in their own right.40 The existing institutional and social barriers did not make it
impossible for a newcomer to enter the commerce, but they did force new entrants to play according to
the rules of the game established by the governing institutions and their monopolies. Only a growing
                                                
40 See one example of a very important Bilbao family illustrated by Priotti, J.-P., Los Echevarri: Mercaderes bilbainos
del siglo de oro. Ascenso social y economico de una familia  ([Bilbao], (1996)). Barkham, M.H., 'Mercaderes,
comercio, y finanzas en el norte de España: Seguro maritimo en Burgos y su desarrollo en San Sebastian y Madrid
(1500-1630)',  in  Actas del V Centenario del Consulado de Burgos (1494-1994) , (Burgos, 1994) shows the same for
the maritime insurance business, which - although clearly dominated by Burgos up to 1580 - was not alien to Basque
merchants either. The earlier view as stated e.g. by Bilbao Bilbao, 'Crisis y reconstrucción', p.160 that in the at least
Basque towns native merchants had no market share at all is overstated although their share was definitely small in the
most lucrative trades.
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trade offered chances for outsiders, when stagnation struck the defensive strategies possible under the
monopoly rules kept the ranks closed.41
The situation of foreign merchants resident in the Cantabrian ports was similar to that of locals.
Antwerp and Nantes merchants enjoyed particular privileges and preferential trade agreements and tried
to appropriate their share of rent from the monopoly structure. The others, like a limited number of
English or Irish, found their particular niche in the commercial sector, while being marginalized from
the main trade flows. They relied on the representations of their consuls for protection in Cantabria.
Close integration with the local community by way of property deals and family bounds seemed to be
the most promising ways of overcoming the potential dangers of being an outsider.42
The strategies of the two most important merchant guilds, the Consulados of Bilbao and Burgos
in this institutional setting are revealing. Their policies are apparent in their long lasting power struggle
over the right to organise the big wool fleets.43 In this conflict both Consulados assumed a strategy
typical of regulated or chartered companies rather than of a traditional merchant guild, namely to
guarantee the monopoly right to exclude members of the other organisation. Each tried to acquire
monopoly status over at least a part of the staple business (in the case of Bilbao), or even the entire
business (in the case of Burgos). Shipping constituted an area of overlapping spheres of influence and
was the main point of friction in the system.
In 1553 the Bilbao merchant guild cancelled an agreement with Burgos that had given Bilbao a
monopoly over part of the exports with the argument that ‘freedom of shipping’ was more beneficial for
the town. The Bilbao Consulado did not mean freedom of the wool trade since it continued to press for
a more advantageous monopoly share in this sector. However, the agreement had obliged Bilbao
merchants to forego trade with merchants from other places such as Vitoria and the Bilbao guild came
to the conclusion that the share of the monopoly Burgos had been offering simply did not compensate
for the loss of other trade which affected Bilbao shipping. In the event Burgos successfully maintained
its influence over the transport business. Within the existing state protected framework a strategy aimed
at market power promised the highest potential returns for the merchant corporations.
                                                
41 Mathers, C.J.,  'Family Partnerships and International Trade in Early Modern Europe: Merchants from Burgos in
England and France, 1470-1570', Business History Review 62 (1988) autumn, pp. 367-397, p.395ff.
42 Croft, J.P.,  'English trade with peninsular Spain 1558-1625', unpubl. PhD (Oxford 1970), p.392ff. The English
consul in Bilbao in the 1550s and 60s was John Cuerton, for some of his trading activities see AFB, Corr.,
Leg.0893/115.
43 Guiard-Larrauri, T., Historia del Consulado de Bilbao y Casa de Contratacion de Bilbao y del comercio de la villa
(1511-1699)  (Bilbao, 1913) and Basas Fernández, El consulado de Burgos, chapter 1. For Bilbao's reasons to oppose
an earlier agreement with Burgos see AFB/CB 061, Num 2 (1553) and a typical mercantile conflict arising out of this
situation regarding the payment of averías (the guild imposition) AFB/CB 061, Num 3 (1555).
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1620s-1650s
The strategies employed by individual merchants and their representative bodies changed
drastically when the economic centre of gravity began to move from Burgos – Medina del Campo
towards the coast itself. The newly established group of English merchants adopted strategies that could
not have been more different from those of their predecessors. Documents reveal that at least 90
English merchants lived for a longer period of time in Bilbao in the 1630s-50s. The real figure is
presumably higher and the number of foreigners in itself was a sign of a more open commercial
structure. Many of these stayed for years, some can be followed over a period of 10 to 15 years.
However, only two are known to have been married to local women. Instead the documentation
indicates that the merchants, agents and factors almost invariably lived in guesthouses and rarely had
brought any family with them. Only three Englishmen applied for citizenship in Bilbao, two of them in
1661 when Anglo-Spanish relations had soured decisively and insurance strategies became more
important again. One was also the son of an English merchant and his Spanish wife.44 Citizenship
brought advantages, in particular the right to acquire property in Bilbao. However, it does not seem that
the English resident in Bilbao even tried to do so. In fact, there had always been ways to avoid the
restriction. Three English factors met no resistance when they rented a plot of land in the centre of
town, presumably as a storage space.45 But no other cases of hiring or buying houses or land are known.
Evidently, the English felt no need to employ the classical means of insurance during this period.
It is particularly interesting that the institution of an English consul, which had existed earlier in
Bilbao, was not revived. The suggestion to re-instate a consul in Bilbao and regulate English trade with
the Cantabrian coast was strongly contested by some of the Bilbao traders themselves in the 1640s and
nothing came of it. They argued that there was no need for a consul since the peace treaty and
Spanish/Vizcayan law provided a sufficient legal basis for most problems of trade. In fact, the reply
defended strongly the efficiency and impartiality of the Northern Spanish judicial bodies. At the same
time, it voiced strong doubts that a consul would only be a vehicle of a few important merchants to
monopolise the trade.46
                                                
44 AFB, Municipal, Leg. 0378/001/004 Thomas Sargent and Leg.0378/001/013 Carlos Down Zabala. William
Francqlin/Guillermo Francolin was one of the two merchants married to a Bilbao woman. In 1636 the scriveners
omitted his citizenship AHPV, Leg. 3119/s.f. but after 1638 he appears as vecino in the documentation, AFB, Corr.,
Leg. 0165/022 (1638) and Leg. 0699/009 (1650).
45 AHPV, Leg. 4331, f.283 R+V, Thomas Pauley, John Trelawny and John Jermyn rented a huerta for five years.
46 BM 712.g.15/9. For a complete list of English merchants at Bilbao, Grafe ‘Northern Spain’, chapter 7 and Appendix
3.
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Just as the English merchants resident in Bilbao rejected attempts to regulate the trade in any
way, the strategies adopted by the Bilbao merchant guild changed as well. Institutionally, both the
Bilbao and Burgos guilds were identical since Bilbao's had been founded on the blueprint of the Burgos
Consulado. As mentioned above, throughout the 16th century both Consulados were constantly
struggling over the monopoly right of wool exports and the rights to organise the wool fleets. When the
network centred on Medina del Campo and Burgos started to crumble, the crown made several attempts
to assist both towns in re-establishing their pre-eminence without success.47
In 1616 the Consulado de Burgos appealed to the crown, San Sebastián, Bilbao and the western
ports around Laredo and Santander in support of a new scheme. It suggested that all foreigners should
be forced to move 20 leguas (ca.120km) inland, i.e. to Burgos, and not be allowed to reside in the ports.
In addition, the six-month wool tax bills should not be payable in the ports but as well in Burgos. The
Crown had already tried the latter rule in 1612 when it apparently ‘allowed’ merchants to pay the 6-
months bills in Medina del Campo. The main argument then was that it had been general practise for
the merchants to pay in Medina throughout the 16th century.48 Furthermore, Burgos' new plan included
that foreigners should not be allowed to sell imported fish in the ports but were to transport it to Burgos.
The Burgos merchant guild sent a letter to its Bilbao counterpart trying to convince the Bilbao
merchants of the usefulness of the scheme. In principal, it suggested nothing different from what had
been the basis for the treaties between the two institutions 60 years earlier: a ‘fair’ division of monopoly
rents. Just as the obligation to reside in Burgos would have increased business there, it also would have
forced the foreigners to employ Cantabrians as their agents in the ports. Notably, Burgos argued that the
measures would slow down foreigners' trade, therefore creating a new demand for storage in Bilbao and
benefiting the local community.49 In short, Burgos was suggesting to increase transaction costs for
foreigners to the levels that had been common in the 16th century and to appropriate those as rents for
Burgos' and Cantabria's merchants.
                                                
47 A royal commission from 1582 onwards was supposed to suggest ways of restoring Medina's and Burgos' wealth.
The initial answer was a harmonisation of the fair schedules, which had some success for a few years but could not
stop the further decline. In 1601, in a big scheme to revive the Northern Castilian towns, the royal court was moved
from Madrid to Valladolid, the main court of justice of Castile, the Chancilleria, from Valladolid to Medina del
Campo and the fairs from Medina del Campo to Burgos. This attempt to help the towns by letting them live on the
rents of some of the major state institutions failed totally and by 1606 the royal court was back in Madrid. For this
Odyssey, see Ruiz Martín, F., 'El Consulado de Burgos y las ferias de pagos de Castilla',  in  Actas del V Centenario
del Consulado de Burgos (1494-1994) , (Burgos, 1994).
48 AFB/CB 066, Num 78. This is a lawsuit of 1658 about the arrangements for the payment of wool tax bills. It
encloses a series of previous regulations, royal pragmatics etc.
49 The full deliberations with several letters from the Consulado de Burgos to its Bilbao counterpart are contained in
AFB/CB 065, Num 50.
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Bilbao rejected the proposal but there is not much evidence for the reasons. From a defence of
the proposal issued by the Burgos guild, it is clear that Vizcaya/Bilbao had argued that its trade would
be seriously diminished. It could be possible that the Bilbao merchant guild simply had bad memories
of similar agreements with Burgos. However, there was little local shipping interest left in Bilbao in the
early 17th century, which would have defended the interests of shipping against those of wool and fish
merchants. It is more likely that the Bilbao merchants were even then only too aware that the presence
of the foreigners in itself was their main business and that this was under threat from Burgos. Even if
the foreigners had accepted a move to Burgos, the Cantabrians would presumably have lost their share
in supplying them with export goods and organising the sale of imports to Castilian merchants. This,
however, was what most Bilbao merchants were engaging in.
In 1616, the very same year in which Burgos had first issued the proposal (negotiations
continued until 1624), Bilbao was once again reminded that the conditions of trade had changed. In a
law suit filed by some merchants from Burgos against the Consulado de Bilbao the Crown Council had
issued a preliminary decision that only the members of the Bilbao guild should pay the local tax, the
averías.50 Graph 1 shows the repercussions. The slump shown for the year is not a fall in actual trade
but a loss that occurred in the collection of the imposition. Foreigners stopped paying averías during a
few months in 1615/16 and the returns from that duty fell almost 60 per cent within a year.
Bilbao's merchants and the whole town had more to gain from free trade with foreigners and
from foreigners residing in the town who enabled them to participate in the wider European and
American trade flows than from any commercial monopoly. At the same time within the new networks
in northern Spain, there was little need for merchants to use Burgos as any sort of commercial centre.
The English in Bilbao got their wool and iron directly from the producing areas via their Cantabrian
partners and left it to these Cantabrians to distribute imported fish and manufactures in Castile. For
Cantabrian merchants, Burgos and Medina del Campo had outlived their usefulness. Refusing to go
back to the rent-sharing agreement of the 16th century in 1624 proved to be far sighted for the
commercial development of the coastal region.
III
This paper argued that we can only understand the impact of commercial expansion on the
regional economies of Europe in the early modern period, if we combine the study of the actual traded
                                                
50 AFB/CB 065, Num 49.
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goods, quantities and direction with that of structural changes. By including the existence gains from
specialisation in our approach, it becomes clear that the gains that resulted from increased trade did not
benefit every region, sector or individual in the same way. How the gains were distributed depended
crucially on the existing market structures and information costs. Changing opportunities for trade
changed the distribution of gains between regions, within regions and between sectors of the regional
economy. Merchants adapted to the existing structures through forms of organisation. Hence, it was
shown that only by including the study of changes to the actual goods trade, their impact on regional
agglomeration and the strategies of adaptation of merchants and their organisations the full
consequences of commercial expansion are revealed.
The paper has shown how such a shift in trading networks between the mid-16th century and the
mid-17th century brought about a lasting economic transition in the Cantabrian region. During a first
phase between 1550-1620 the region’s commercial sector was closely integrated into the wider
Northern Spanish networks through which it also got immersed indirectly into the Spanish colonial
world. During a second phase after 1620 this link broke and instead the region forged stronger
mercantile links with the English Atlantic. The opening of this new Atlantic trade prompted important
structural change for the region.
On the macro-level it redistributed the gains of trade between sectors within the region,
favouring merchants and iron producers and food consumers, but leaving behind shipping interests. The
distributional impact of these changes was strongly felt by the northern Castilian towns, which suffered
at the expense of relative prosperity on the Coast itself. However, even in the coastal region proper the
pattern of commercial specialisation changed with the emergence of a dominant trading centre and the
decline of activity in the smaller ports. While the region as a whole was undoubtedly on the winning
side, the more detailed discussion shows the importance of distributional changes through increased
trade.
On the micro-level the strategies of institutional change and organisational adaptation are
equally evident. The Bilbao Consulado abandoned its earlier strategy of market power maximisation
and embraced a new more open approach. Although is constitutional set-up did not change its policies
changed dramatically; one could argue that it developed from a ‘regulated company’ into a ‘chamber of
commerce’. The merchants itself adapted as well to the new world. While kinship remained important
within the individual business, it became possible to trade on an individual basis rather than as a
member of a specific group.
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